While the drafts for RFC 9190 used a separate Commitment Message term,
that term was removed from the published RFC. Update the debug prints to
match that final language.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The previously used references were pointing to an obsoleted RFC and
draft versions. Replace these with current versions.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Recognize the explicitly defined Commitment Message per
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-13 at the conclusion of the EAP-TTLS with TLS
1.3.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
Use the TLS-Exporter with the label and context as defined in
draft-ietf-emu-tls-eap-types-00 when deriving keys for EAP-TTLS with TLS
1.3.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
EAP peer does not expect data present when beginning the Phase 2 in
EAP-{TTLS,PEAP} but in TLS 1.3 session tickets are sent after the
handshake completes.
There are several strategies that can be used to handle this, but this
patch picks up from the discussion[1] and implements the proposed use of
SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY. SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY has already been enabled by
default in OpenSSL 1.1.1, but it needs to be enabled for older versions.
The main OpenSSL wrapper change in tls_connection_decrypt() takes care
of the new possible case with SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY for
SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ to indicate that a non-application_data was
processed. That is not really an error case with TLS 1.3, so allow it to
complete and return an empty decrypted application data buffer.
EAP-PEAP/TTLS processing can then use this to move ahead with starting
Phase 2.
[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/hostap/msg05376.html
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
The implementation was previously hardcoded to use only the non-expanded
IETF EAP methods in Phase 2. Extend that to allow vendor EAP methods
with expanded header to be used.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Allow an additional context value to be passed to TLS exporter as
specified in RFC 5705 section 4.
This does not yet implement it for the internal TLS implementation.
However, as currently nothing uses context yet, this will not break
anything right now. WolfSSL maintainers also stated that they are not
going to add context support yet, but would look into it if/when this is
required by a published draft or a standard.
Signed-off-by: Ervin Oro <ervin.oro@aalto.fi>
These buffers in TLS-based EAP methods might contain keys or password
(e.g., when using TTLS-PAP or PEAP-GTC), so clear them explicitly to
avoid leaving such material into heap memory unnecessarily.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
A lot of internally used crypto headers are publicly includeable
in user projects. This leads to bug reports when these headers
are incorrectly used or the API's are not used as intended.
Move all crypto headers into private crypto src folder, also move
crypto_ops into Supplicant to remove dependecy on crypto headers.
Closes IDF-476
Move supplicant to idf and do following refactoring:
1. Make the folder structure consitent with supplicant upstream
2. Remove duplicated header files and minimize the public header files
3. Refactor for WiFi/supplicant interfaces
Sarvesh Bodakhe