This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
SAE: Internal WPA_KEY_MGMT_* defines for extended key AKMs
Define new WPA_KEY_MGMT_* values for the new SAE AKM suite selectors
with variable length keys. This includes updates to various mapping and
checking of the SAE key_mgmt values.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
1. Add changes in 4-way handshake path to allow SAE key mgmt.
2. Support for configuring WAP3 at init time, added Kconfig option.
3. Handle and propagate error conditions properly.
4. Link changes from WiFi library.
1. Add APIs for configuring PMF through set config.
2. Map Supplicant and Wifi Cipher types.
3. Add support for PMF negotiation while generating RSN IE.
1) Added PMK caching module from wpa_supplicant.
2) Modified wpa_sm to
a) Add entry to PMK cache when first time associated to an AP.
b) Maintain entry across the associations.
c) Clear current PMKSA when deauth happens.
d) Search for an entry when re-associating to the same AP and
set it as current PMKSA
e) Wait for msg 1/4 from AP instead of starting EAP authentication.
f) Check PMKID in msg 1 with current PMKSA/cache.
g) Use the cached PMK to complete 4-way handshake.
3) Remove config_bss callback as it was redundant and used to cause
problems for PMK caching flow.
Closes IDF-969
Move supplicant to idf and do following refactoring:
1. Make the folder structure consitent with supplicant upstream
2. Remove duplicated header files and minimize the public header files
3. Refactor for WiFi/supplicant interfaces
Jouni Malinen