esp-idf/components/wpa_supplicant/src/eap_peer/eap_tls.c

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/*
* EAP peer method: EAP-TLS (RFC 5216, RFC 9190)
* Copyright (c) 2004-2008, 2012-2019, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
*
* This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
* See README for more details.
*/
#include "utils/includes.h"
#ifdef EAP_TLS
#include "utils/common.h"
#include "crypto/tls.h"
#include "eap_peer/eap_i.h"
#include "eap_peer/eap_defs.h"
#include "eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h"
#include "eap_peer/eap_config.h"
#include "eap_peer/eap_methods.h"
static void eap_tls_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv);
struct eap_tls_data {
struct eap_ssl_data ssl;
u8 *key_data;
u8 *session_id;
size_t id_len;
void *ssl_ctx;
u8 eap_type;
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation This adds support for optional functionality to validate server certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program. wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is. This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation. When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that configuration is not really recommend. By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter. When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the control interface. The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following event: CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid> Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump> parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on). The result of the external validation is provided with the following command: CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad> It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated without sending more messages to the server. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 16:16:54 +00:00
struct wpabuf *pending_resp;
bool prot_success_received;
};
static void * eap_tls_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
{
struct eap_tls_data *data;
struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
if (config == NULL ||
config->private_key == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TLS: Private key not configured");
return NULL;
}
data = (struct eap_tls_data *)os_zalloc(sizeof(*data));
if (data == NULL)
return NULL;
data->ssl_ctx = sm->ssl_ctx;
if (eap_peer_tls_ssl_init(sm, &data->ssl, config, EAP_TYPE_TLS)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TLS: Failed to initialize SSL.");
eap_tls_deinit(sm, data);
return NULL;
}
data->eap_type = EAP_TYPE_TLS;
return data;
}
static void eap_tls_free_key(struct eap_tls_data *data)
{
if (data->key_data) {
bin_clear_free(data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN);
data->key_data = NULL;
}
}
static void eap_tls_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_tls_data *data = priv;
if (data == NULL)
return;
eap_peer_tls_ssl_deinit(sm, &data->ssl);
eap_tls_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation This adds support for optional functionality to validate server certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program. wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is. This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation. When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that configuration is not really recommend. By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter. When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the control interface. The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following event: CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid> Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump> parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on). The result of the external validation is provided with the following command: CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad> It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated without sending more messages to the server. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 16:16:54 +00:00
wpabuf_free(data->pending_resp);
os_free(data);
}
static struct wpabuf * eap_tls_failure(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_tls_data *data,
struct eap_method_ret *ret, int res,
struct wpabuf *resp, u8 id)
{
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TLS: TLS processing failed");
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
if (res == -1) {
struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
if (config) {
/*
* The TLS handshake failed. So better forget the old
* PIN. It may be wrong, we cannot be sure but trying
* the wrong one again might block it on the card--so
* better ask the user again.
*/
os_free(config->pin);
config->pin = NULL;
}
}
if (resp) {
/*
* This is likely an alert message, so send it instead of just
* ACKing the error.
*/
return resp;
}
return eap_peer_tls_build_ack(id, data->eap_type, 0);
}
static void eap_tls_success(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_tls_data *data,
struct eap_method_ret *ret)
{
const char *label;
const u8 eap_tls13_context[] = { EAP_TYPE_TLS };
const u8 *context = NULL;
size_t context_len = 0;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TLS: Done");
if (data->ssl.tls_out) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TLS: Fragment(s) remaining");
return;
}
if (data->ssl.tls_v13) {
label = "EXPORTER_EAP_TLS_Key_Material";
context = eap_tls13_context;
context_len = 1;
/* A possible NewSessionTicket may be received before
* EAP-Success, so need to allow it to be received. */
ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT;
ret->decision = DECISION_COND_SUCC;
} else {
label = "client EAP encryption";
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
}
eap_tls_free_key(data);
data->key_data = eap_peer_tls_derive_key(sm, &data->ssl, label,
context, context_len,
EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN +
EAP_EMSK_LEN);
if (data->key_data) {
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TLS: Derived key",
data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TLS: Derived EMSK",
data->key_data + EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN,
EAP_EMSK_LEN);
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-TLS: Failed to derive key");
}
os_free(data->session_id);
data->session_id = eap_peer_tls_derive_session_id(sm, &data->ssl,
EAP_TYPE_TLS,
&data->id_len);
if (data->session_id) {
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TLS: Derived Session-Id",
data->session_id, data->id_len);
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-TLS: Failed to derive Session-Id");
}
}
static struct wpabuf * eap_tls_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
struct eap_method_ret *ret,
const struct wpabuf *reqData)
{
size_t left;
int res;
struct wpabuf *resp;
u8 flags, id;
const u8 *pos;
struct eap_tls_data *data = priv;
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation This adds support for optional functionality to validate server certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program. wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is. This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation. When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that configuration is not really recommend. By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter. When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the control interface. The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following event: CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid> Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump> parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on). The result of the external validation is provided with the following command: CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad> It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated without sending more messages to the server. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 16:16:54 +00:00
if (sm->waiting_ext_cert_check && data->pending_resp) {
struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm);
if (config->pending_ext_cert_check == EXT_CERT_CHECK_GOOD) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"EAP-TLS: External certificate check succeeded - continue handshake");
resp = data->pending_resp;
data->pending_resp = NULL;
sm->waiting_ext_cert_check = 0;
return resp;
}
if (config->pending_ext_cert_check == EXT_CERT_CHECK_BAD) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"EAP-TLS: External certificate check failed - force authentication failure");
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
sm->waiting_ext_cert_check = 0;
return NULL;
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"EAP-TLS: Continuing to wait external server certificate validation");
return NULL;
}
pos = eap_peer_tls_process_init(sm, &data->ssl, data->eap_type, ret,
reqData, &left, &flags);
if (pos == NULL)
return NULL;
id = eap_get_id(reqData);
if (flags & EAP_TLS_FLAGS_START) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-TLS: Start");
left = 0; /* make sure that this frame is empty, even though it
* should always be, anyway */
}
resp = NULL;
res = eap_peer_tls_process_helper(sm, &data->ssl, data->eap_type, 0,
id, pos, left, &resp);
if (res < 0) {
return eap_tls_failure(sm, data, ret, res, resp, id);
}
EAP peer: External server certificate chain validation This adds support for optional functionality to validate server certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program. wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is. This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation. When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that configuration is not really recommend. By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter. When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the control interface. The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following event: CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid> Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump> parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on). The result of the external validation is provided with the following command: CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad> It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated without sending more messages to the server. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
2015-12-12 16:16:54 +00:00
if (sm->waiting_ext_cert_check) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"EAP-TLS: Waiting external server certificate validation");
wpabuf_free(data->pending_resp);
data->pending_resp = resp;
return NULL;
}
/* RFC 9190 Section 2.5 */
if (res == 2 && data->ssl.tls_v13 && wpabuf_len(resp) == 1 &&
*wpabuf_head_u8(resp) == 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
"EAP-TLS: ACKing protected success indication (appl data 0x00)");
eap_peer_tls_reset_output(&data->ssl);
res = 1;
ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
data->prot_success_received = true;
}
if (tls_connection_established(data->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
(!data->ssl.tls_v13 || data->prot_success_received))
eap_tls_success(sm, data, ret);
if (res == 1) {
wpabuf_free(resp);
return eap_peer_tls_build_ack(id, data->eap_type, 0);
}
return resp;
}
static bool eap_tls_isKeyAvailable(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_tls_data *data = priv;
return data->key_data != NULL;
}
static u8 * eap_tls_getKey(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len)
{
struct eap_tls_data *data = priv;
u8 *key;
if (data->key_data == NULL)
return NULL;
key = os_malloc(EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
if (key == NULL)
return NULL;
*len = EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN;
os_memcpy(key, data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
return key;
}
int eap_peer_tls_register(void)
{
struct eap_method *eap;
int ret;
eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_TLS,
"TLS");
if (eap == NULL)
return -1;
eap->init = eap_tls_init;
eap->deinit = eap_tls_deinit;
eap->process = eap_tls_process;
eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_tls_isKeyAvailable;
eap->getKey = eap_tls_getKey;
ret = eap_peer_method_register(eap);
if (ret)
eap_peer_method_free(eap);
return ret;
}
#endif /* EAP_TLS */